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ABSTRACT 
 
There is a surprisingly high number of new products and services that fail to produce 
enough return on the firm’s investments in development and launch activities. 
Literature has shown that these failures can be due to a poorly planned and executed 
launch. Although a vast stream of research has studied how strategic and tactical 
launch decisions affect the performance of new products and services, some issues 
still need theoretical and empirical investigation. This article aims to extend new 
product launch research in two ways. First, it studies how tactical launch decisions 
(i.e. investments in advertising and involvement of external organizations in the 
launch process) interact with an important strategic choice (i.e. the degree of 
radicalness of the new product or service) to affect new product performance. Second, 
it focuses on a particular dimension of performance, i.e. early market survival, which 
has been overlooked in launch strategy and tactics research so far. Using a dataset 
comprising more than 9,300 new mobile Value Added Services (VAS) launched in 
Italy between 2003 and 2006, the article finds that launch tactics interact with the 
radicalness of the innovation to affect early market survival. In particular, 
communicating the distinctive characteristics of the new product or service and 
partnering with external organizations during the launch process are tactics which 
work particularly well with radical innovations. This is possibly due to the fact that 
they help reduce customers’ uncertainty regarding expected benefits and transaction 
costs and hence contribute to win their resistance to adopt the innovation soon after 
launch. Investments in corporate advertising lead instead to a tangible improvement of 
the probability of early market survival for both radical and incremental innovations. 
In other words, the positive impact on the probability of early survival of increasing 
investments in corporate advertising appears to be relevant for both radically- and 
incrementally-new services. One possible explanation is that this tactic helps increase 
the number of potential customers who come to know about the existence of the 
innovating firms and its offering soon after launch, but this is likely to be equally 
important to stimulate early diffusion of both incremental and radical innovations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is well known that a remarkably high percentage of all new products and services 
fail to produce enough return on the firm’s investments in development and launch 
activities (Cierpicki, 2000). As shown by Gourville (2006), market analysts tend to 
believe that the reasons underlying these failures are related to inaccurate product 
conception and development, which result into an innovation lacking some critical 
functionalities. In fact, the performance of a new product or service can be heavily 
affected by the strategies and tactics used to launch it in the market (Chiesa and 
Frattini, 2011). 
 
As a result, a vast stream of research has developed with the aim to study how launch 
decisions affect the performance of new products and services (see, e.g., Hultink et 
al., 1997; Di Benedetto, 1999; Talke and Hultink, 2010a,b). Launch decisions are 
those “[…] necessary to present a product to its target market and begin to generate 
income from sale of the new product” (Hultink et al., 1997, p. 245). A relevant part of 
the launch decision-making occurs prior to making the marketing mix launch 
decisions, and even before the new product development (NPD) process is started. 
These are called strategic launch decisions and concern the “what” to launch, “where” 
to launch, “when” to launch and “why” to launch. They define the strategic context in 
which market launch occurs and regard the firm’s innovation and competitive 
strategies, e.g., whether a radical or an incremental innovation should be developed 
and launched. Nonetheless, other launch decisions take place after the conceptual and 
physical development of the product is completed. These are named tactical launch 
decisions and concern the “how” to launch, i.e. refer to the elements of the so-called 
marketing mix (product, price, promotion and distribution decisions). 
 
The aim of this article is to extend launch strategy and tactics literature in two ways. 
First, this body of research shows that strategic and tactical launch decisions should 
be consistent so as to maximize new product or service success (Hultink et al., 1997; 
1998). However, it does not study in details how specific tactical launch decisions 
interact with launch strategies to affect performance. This although managers make 
marketing mix choices several months or years after the strategic context in which 
launch occurs has been defined. Due to changes in market conditions or competitors’ 
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reactions, there might be the need to intervene on the operational aspects of the launch 
and perhaps revise the intended tactics. It would be important therefore for product 
and marketing managers to have a deeper understanding of how the impact on new 
product or service performance of their tactical launch choices depends on the 
strategic decisions already taken in the development process, which define the 
strategic context in which launch occurs. In particular, in this article we study how 
two tactical launch decisions (i.e. investments in advertising and involvement of 
external organizations in the launch process) interact with an important strategic 
launch choice (i.e. the degree of radicalness of the new product or service) to affect 
performance. 
 
Second, launch strategy and tactics research assumes that launch decisions have an 
influence over two dimensions of new product or service performance (Hultink et al., 
1998; Talke and Hultink, 2010a): product performance (e.g., the new product’s 
quality and competitive advantage) and market performance (e.g., the new product’s 
market share, sales or ROI). As remarked by Asterbo and Michela (2005), however, 
new product or service success entails at least one more criterion, i.e. the ability to 
survive and remain on the market. In order to achieve good market performance, a 
new product or service needs indeed to survive the introduction stage of its life cycle, 
i.e. it has to experience enough diffusion and meet the first sales targets so as to avoid 
being retired from the market. Early failure can happen also with very well-developed 
innovations, as shown in the cases of the IBM PC-Junior in 1985 and the Google 
Wave networking service in 2010. This indicates that there might be new products or 
services with the potential to achieve very good market performance, which fail to do 
so because of poor early market diffusion, and points to the importance of taking early 
survival into proper account in launch strategy and tactics research. In this article we 
specifically examine the impact of launch decisions on early market survival. Using 
the traditional product life cycle model (Day, 1981), early market survival is defined 
here as the ability of a new product or service to survive the introduction stage of its 
life cycle and not being withdrawn from the market before its sales can eventually 
enter the steady growth phase. It should be noticed that early market survival, as 
defined in this article, is conceptually different from the idea of “crossing the chasm” 
developed by Geoffrey Moore (1991). Moore explains that many high-tech 
innovations fail to bridge the “chasm” between early adopters and the majority of 
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their potential adopters, because of poorly conceived marketing strategies. Although 
these products or services are enthusiastically received immediately after launch, they 
never diffuse in the largest part of their target market. In this article we are interested 
instead in those new products and services that fail to diffuse among their early 
adopters (i.e. do not survive the introduction stage of their life cycle) and, as a result, 
are withdrawn from the market, on the basis of a rational decision, before they can 
eventually spread among the less innovative and more conservative (Rogers, 2003) 
market segments. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the conceptual model underlying this article, which aims to study: (i) 
how the radicalness of the new product or service affects early market survival; (ii) 
how investments in advertising and the involvement of external organizations in the 
launch process affect early market survival; (iii) how investments in advertising and 
the involvement of external organizations in the launch process interact with the 
radicalness of the new product or service to affect early market survival. 
 
Strategic launch decisions:
- Radicalness of the new 
product-service
Early market survival
Tactical launch
decisions:
- Investments in advertising
- Involvement of external 
organizations
i
ii
iii
 
Figure 1: Conceptual model of launch decisions and the early market survival of innovations 
 
The model is tested using a dataset comprising more than 9,300 new mobile Value 
Added Services (VAS) launched between 2003 and 2006 on the Italian market. 
Mobile VAS are defined in this article as application-to-person (A2P) services beyond 
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standard voice calls and fax transmissions. VAS is a popular telecommunications 
industry term for non-core services. This empirical setting is particularly appropriate 
for the purpose of the analysis because: 
 Italy is the European country where mobile VAS have experienced the steadiest 
and most significant diffusion in the last decade; 
 firms competing in the mobile VAS industry are very innovative and hundreds of 
new services are launched every year on the market; 
 the mobile VAS industry is characterized by a very high mortality rate, with a 
sizeable percentage of new services being withdrawn from the market due to poor 
sales a few months after launch, and a limited number of VAS that survive for 
several years and become the source of substantial revenues and profits. 
 
The structure of the article is as follows. The next section develops theory and 
hypotheses. Afterwards, an overview on the data and the methodology used in the 
analysis is given. The ensuing section describes and discusses the empirical results. 
Finally, conclusions and avenues for future research are outlined. 
 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Launch strategies and tactics 
A host of empirical studies have been conducted to understand how strategic and 
tactical launch decisions affect new product or service performance (Hultink and Hart, 
1998; Hultink and Robben, 1999; Talke and Colarelli O’Connor, 2011). One 
important finding of this stream of research is that successfully launching a new 
product or service requires consistency between strategic and tactical launch 
decisions. Hultink et al. (1997), e.g., identify four internally consistent sets of launch 
decisions, which are labeled as “niche followers”, “niche innovators”, “mass 
marketers” and “would-be me-toos”. Similarly, Hultink et al. (1998) unearth three 
typologies of new product launch, i.e. “innovative new products”, “offensive 
improvements” and “defensive additions”. The assumption underlying these works is 
that, when it comes to make tactical launch choices, product and marketing managers 
basically put into practice the strategic decisions already taken in the development 
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process. However, as discussed in the introduction of this article, to the best 
knowledge of the authors there are no studies investigating how tactical, marketing 
mix decisions interact with earlier strategic choices to affect the likelihood of new 
product success. This is instead an important concern for product and marketing 
managers who are required to continuously adjust their launch tactics to the changing 
market and competitive context. 
 
Similarly, how launch strategies and tactics influence early survival remains a largely 
overlooked topic. A notable exception is research on pioneer advantage (e.g., Golder 
and Tellis, 1993), which investigates how one critical strategic launch decision (i.e. 
timing) affect the ability of a new product or service to remain on the market for long 
time. In a study of the predictors of the survival of innovations, Asterbo and Michela 
(2005) include some decision variables regarding the launch process (e.g., marketing 
and sales costs), but their model is mainly focused on exogenous, not controllable 
predictors. Finally, Chiesa and Frattini (2011) explain how and why launch decisions 
can determine new product failure, but they do not distinguish failure due to an early 
withdrawal of the product from the market or to its inability to achieve substantial 
customer acceptance. There are also some studies in which the notion of new product 
survival is used ambiguously. For instance, Thieme et al. (2003) define a new product 
as surviving in the marketplace if it attains targets regarding, e.g., return on 
investment, profitability, sales, market share. 
 
This brief review of the literature points to the need for further theoretical and 
empirical analyses on how tactical launch decisions interact with strategic decisions to 
affect new product or service early survival. 
 
As regards strategic decisions, in this article we focus on the radicalness of the new 
product or service. A radical innovation is defined as “a new product, generally 
containing new technologies, that significantly changes behavior and consumption 
patterns” in the target market. An incremental innovation is “an innovation that 
improves the conveyance of a currently delivered benefit, but produces neither a 
behavior change nor a change in consumption”i. This strategic decision seems to be 
particularly critical in affecting early market survival, as suggested by marketing and 
radical innovation research (Alexander et al., 2008; Rice et al., 2002). As regards 
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tactical launch decisions, this article focuses on two policies that product and 
marketing managers can adopt to improve the likelihood of achieving substantial 
market acceptance, i.e. investments in promotion and advertising activities and the 
involvement of external organizations in the launch process, e.g., through the 
establishment of partnerships and cooperation agreements. These have been identified 
as critical tactics by marketing researchers especially in high-technology, high-
velocity industries (e.g., Beard and Easingwood, 1996), which are the main focus of 
our analysis. 
 
Launch strategies: radicalness of the new product or service 
A new product or service fails to survive the introduction stage of its life cycle 
because it experiences unsatisfactory levels of sales, i.e. because of limited customer 
acceptance. According to sociological theories of innovation diffusion (Turnbull and 
Meenaghan, 1980; Burt, 1987; Deroïan, 2002), the main reason why potential 
adopters decide not to purchase (or delay the purchase of) a new product or service is 
uncertainty. Innovations elicit indeed a great deal of uncertainty in prospective buyers, 
which often results into a postponement of the adoption decision (Chiesa and Frattini, 
2011). Even when some specifications and consumer reports are available, and the 
cost of purchase is exactly known, adopters may still be unconfident about how the 
product will perform for them, whether it is suited to the uses they have in mind and 
whether it will receive support from suppliers of complementary equipments, software 
or additional services. 
 
However, the degree of customers' pre-purchase uncertainty and hence their resistance 
to change vary considerably depending on the type of innovation. In particular, the 
greater the change in behavior and consumer patterns required to make the most out 
of a new product or service, the higher the degree of uncertainty the potential 
customer will perceive, which can slow and ultimately freeze early diffusion (Chiesa 
and Frattini, 2011). This proposition is also grounded in marketing research, which 
suggests that the likelihood of having a new product withdrawn from the market for 
poor commercial performance early after launch is particularly high for really-new 
products (Alexander et al., 2008). This because, when confronted with a radically-
new product, as compared with an incrementally-new one, customers perceive: (i) 
greater uncertainty about the consumption benefits and transaction costs (Hoeffler, 
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2003); (ii) the need to more deeply modify their behavior to reap the potential benefits 
of the new product (Gourville, 2006). 
 
Put it differently, the more radical a new product or service, the higher the uncertainty 
perceived by potential adopters and hence the higher the likelihood that they will 
postpone purchase, this resulting into a limited after-launch acceptance of the 
innovation and eventually its withdrawal from the market. This argument is consistent 
with research on radical innovation management (McDermott and Colarelli 
O’Connor, 2002). Adopting the point of view of the firm developing and 
commercializing this type of new products or services, it shows that radical 
innovation projects are characterized by soaring levels of uncertainty (regarding 
market, technology, resources), which result into particularly high chances of market 
failure (Rice et al., 2002). Therefore we posit that: 
 
H1: The radicalness of the new product or service will be negatively associated with 
early market survival 
 
Despite the above, it may be advisable to develop and launch a very radical new 
product or service because, if initial resistance to change is overcome, it can 
determine substantial advantages in terms of higher margins, expanded market and 
increased corporate reputation (Leifer et al., 2001). 
 
Launch tactics: investments in advertising and involvement of external organizations 
Research on diffusion of innovation has long struggled to identify the reasons 
underlying diffusion and lack of diffusion of new products and services (Geroski, 
2000). However, most of the existing interpretative and predictive models focus on 
the role of demand-side factors in shaping diffusion processes, e.g., characteristics of 
the prospective purchasers (Rogers, 2003), spread of information between them (Bass, 
1969), imitation and bandwagon phenomena (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997), 
social contagion and cohesion effects (Burt, 1987). 
 
The role of supply-side variables, i.e. those levers that can be directly controlled by 
the firm which introduces the innovation into the market, has been instead largely 
neglected so far. Exceptions are those pieces of research that have studied: (i) which 
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characteristics of the new product or service explain heterogeneous rates of diffusion 
(Rogers, 2003); (ii) which is the role of feedbacks and interactions between 
developers and users in shaping diffusion processes (Mukoyama, 2004). Moreover, 
several attempts to generalize well-known diffusion models have been made. For 
instance, the Generalized Bass Model (Mahajan et al., 1995) has been developed with 
the aim to account for decision variables regarding, e.g., increase or reduction of 
prices. However, these contributions do not specifically focus on new product and 
service early survival and do not allow to consider the more qualitative aspects 
underlying launch tactics (Chiesa and Frattini, 2011). 
 
As explained above, this article focuses on two basic tactics that product and 
marketing managers can adopt during launch, namely investments in promotion and 
advertising and the involvement of external organizations in the launch process, e.g., 
through the establishment of partnerships and cooperation agreements. 
 
As regards investments in promotion and advertising, especially when undertaken 
using mass communication channels, we argue that they can help improve the 
likelihood of achieving satisfactory new product acceptance after launch because they 
increase: (i) the amount of information about the consumption benefits and transaction 
costs associated with purchase and use of the innovation that can reach potential 
adopters; (ii) the number of potential adopters who come to know about the existence 
of the innovating firm and its new product or service. Although world-of-mouth 
communication is key in determining substantial levels of diffusion into the more 
conservative segments of the potential market (Chiesa and Frattini, 2011; Rogers, 
2003; Wind and Mahajan, 1987), initial uptake of an innovation and hence the 
likelihood of early survival depends on the amount of information disseminated 
through advertising and promotion campaigns. This is confirmed by both epidemic or 
disequilibrium diffusion theories (Mahajan et al., 1990) and by sociological models of 
innovation diffusion, according to which customers who purchase early an innovation 
are those more exposed to external communication channels, such as mass-media, 
than the rest of the population (Van den Bulte and Lilien, 2001). Therefore we posit 
the following: 
 
H2: Investments in advertising will be positively associated with early market survival 
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In this article we are especially interested in how investments in advertising and the 
radicalness of the innovation interact to affect early market survival. Based on the 
arguments presented so far, it can be assumed that the positive impact of investments 
in advertising on the innovation after-launch survival will be stronger for radically-
new products, in comparison with incremental innovations. This because, as explained 
above, uncertainty surrounding adoption decisions and hence resistance to change will 
be more pronounced when the innovation requires potential adopters to substantially 
change their habits and consumption patterns, which happens in case of highly radical 
innovations (Alexander et al., 2008; Rice et al., 2002). This leads us to argue that: 
 
H2a: Investments in advertising will have a stronger association with early market 
survival for more radical new products and services 
 
Another approach that product and marketing managers can adopt to reduce perceived 
uncertainty and resistance to change entails the involvement of external organizations 
in the launch of the innovation. In the last years, more and more markets have taken 
on the characteristics of networks (Chakravorti, 2004). Therefore decisions regarding 
the adoption of new products and services are increasingly dispersed among many 
interrelated organizations, whose decisions influence each others’. These players 
constitute the so-called adoption network of the innovation (Chakravorti, 2003), 
which typically comprises: (i) companies supplying complementary hardware, 
software and contents; (ii) companies involved in distributing the innovation and 
information about it; (iii) companies providing complementary services (e.g., 
customer assistance, billing, payment). Winning customers’ resistance to adoption is 
very challenging under these circumstances, because they might be highly unsure not 
only about the value of the innovation per se, but also as regards the degree of support 
that the members of this adoption network will ensure to the innovation. Therefore, 
increasing the involvement of the members of the adoption network in the launch of 
the innovation is useful to signal to potential purchasers that the new product or 
service is very well backed and receives support from the several parties whose role is 
critical to ensure a successful adoption of the new product. This is not a new concept 
in marketing research (e.g., Wind and Mahajan, 1987), but it has become even more 
important in today’s highly interconnected markets. Therefore we posit the following: 
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H3: Involvement of external organizations in the launch of the innovation will be 
positively associated with early market survival 
 
Again, in this article we are especially interested in how the involvement of external 
organizations in the launch process and the radicalness of the innovation interact to 
affect early market survival. Based on the above discussion, it is possible to argue that 
the positive impact of involving external organizations in the launch of the innovation 
will be stronger for radically-new products, in comparison with incremental 
innovations. This because, as explained above, uncertainty surrounding adoption 
decisions and hence resistance to change will be more pronounced when the 
innovation requires potential adopters to substantially change their consumption 
patterns (Alexander et al., 2008; Rice et al., 2002). It is under these circumstances that 
the signaling effect of having involved many external players in the launch process 
plays a more critical role in determining substantial early diffusion (Schilling, 2003). 
This is why we posit that: 
 
H3a: Involvement of external organizations in the launch of the innovation will have a 
stronger association with early market survival for more radical new products 
and services 
 
The conceptual model and the research hypotheses developed in this section are 
synthesized in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Research hypotheses 
 
The next sections describe the empirical data and the analyses that have been 
undertaken to test our hypotheses. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Empirical setting 
The empirical setting of our research is the Italian mobile Value Added Services 
(VAS) industry. VAS comprise all services beyond standard voice calls and fax 
transmissions. Therefore, they add value to the standard telecommunications offering, 
encouraging subscribers to increase the use of their phone and allowing the operator 
to enhance its average revenue per unit (ARPU). The importance of VAS in the 
mobile telecommunication (TLC) market has substantially increased during the last 
years, especially in Italy. This is clearly evinced considering that Italy has the world’s 
highest mobile VAS penetration and diffusion rates (IDATE, 2009; Informa, 2009). 
As shown in Figure 3, the average annual growth rate of the Italian mobile VAS 
market in the recent years is close to 26%. 
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Figure 3: Overall annual turnover (in €) of the Italian mobile VAS market in 2003-2008 (source: 
Bertelè et al., 2009) 
 
Data on the Italian mobile VAS industry have been collected since 2002 by a research 
group within Politecnico di Milano, the Information and Communication Technology 
& Management Observatory (www.osservatori.net). Founded in 1998, it offers up-to-
date analyses on the impact of information and communication technology (ICT) on 
private companies, public administrations and industries. The research project devoted 
to mobile VAS was started in 2002 and it represents today a very well-respected 
source of data for companies, consultants and analysts with an interest in the Italian 
mobile VAS industry. The ongoing research yearly provides a synoptic view of all the 
mobile VAS offered on the Italian market. In particular, the mobile VAS project has 
collected data on all the new services launched in Italy since 2003 (which was the first 
year when these services were offered to Italian mobile phones users). Because 
criteria for data collection changed in 2008, we narrowed the timeframe of our 
analysis to the mobile VAS launched between 2003 and 2007. 
 
A mobile VAS can be delivered to customers using different technological platforms. 
The two largely prevailing in Italy in the 2003-2007 period were: 
 Short Message Service (or SMS), which allows the sending of short text messages 
between mobile phones and other handheld devices. The first application-to-person 
(A2P) VAS based on SMS were offered to customers in Italy in 2003; 
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 Browsing (also known as mobile-browsing or micro-browsing), which allows the 
phone user to surf mobile-sites and mobile-portals like with traditional desktop 
internet browsers. The first A2P VAS delivered using Browsing appeared in Italy 
in 2004. 
SMS and Browsing accounted for 80% of the total revenues in 2003 and 2004 and 
70% in 2005, 2006 and 2007. Among the other marginal technologies, multimedia 
message service (MMS) accounted only for 5% of the total revenues during the period 
2003-2007, whereas Download accounted for 15% of the total revenues in 2003-2004 
and for 25% in 2005-2007. 
 
Our study focuses on SMS and Browsing, which are highly representative of the 
Italian mobile VAS industry in the period under analysis. Both platforms were used to 
deliver to customer different contents: Infotainment are those services that provide 
information and/or entertainment contents (e.g., news, sport, cinema); Personalization 
are those that allow users to personalize their mobile phone (e.g., with logos, 
ringtones, wallpapers); Community services enable people to interact and 
communicate with each other on real time (e.g., chat); finally, Gaming services allow 
customers to play games on their mobile phone. No other different contents were 
offered to customers in the 2003-2007 period using the marginal technologies not 
included in our analysis (i.e. MMS and Download). 
 
The complexity of the mobile VAS industry is due to the existence of different 
approaches that can be used by the Mobile Service Provider (MSP) to launch a new 
service. First, the different actors of the adoption network of a new mobile VAS, that 
can be involved in the launch process, are 5: 
 the Mobile Network Operator (MNO), which provides access to the mobile 
communication infrastructure and platforms (e.g., the billing and customer care 
systems) and is responsible for the contractual relationship with the customer. The 
MNOs which operate in Italy are Tim, Vodafone, Wind and H3G; 
 the Mobile Content Provider (MCP), which develops the contents to be delivered 
through the mobile VAS and receives royalties or fees based on the sales of the 
service; 
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 the Mobile Technology Provider (MTP), which is involved in the development of 
the underlying platforms for mobile communication; 
 the Record & Movie Production Company (RMPC), which operates in media 
communication to end-consumers; 
 the Web Editor (WE), which produces web contents and acts as a content 
aggregator. 
These external actors can be involved by the MSP to a varying extent in the twelve 
distinct activities which are required to launch a new service, i.e. platform 
development, content development (which entails the following tasks: content 
creation, content packaging, content publishing, content management and portal 
provisioning), advertising (which includes two activities, i.e. advertising content 
creation and advertising bundling), delivery (which can be further distinguished into 
content delivery and content charging), billing (which includes accounting and 
customer relationship management). Of course some of these tasks are always under 
the responsibility of an external actor (e.g., the MNO is always involved in billing), 
but there is the chance for the MSP to enlarge the involvement of an external actor to 
several other activities (e.g., the MNO, which is highly visible to the end user of the 
mobile VAS due to its size and brand awareness, can be asked to participate in 
delivery and advertising). The mobile VAS research project allows to track which 
external actors have been involved by the MSP in each launch activity, for every 
mobile VAS launched in Italy in the period 2003-2007. 
 
Variables 
Preliminary interviews with experts in the Italian mobile VAS industryii showed that a 
high percentage of new VAS do not survive the first months after launch. In 
particular, our data indicate that about 66% of the new services are no more offered to 
customers in the year that follows the one when they were first launched (i.e. have a 
life cycle which is shorter than 12 months). However, those services that survive the 
first year remain on the market for a long time (on average for more than 3 years) and 
become a major source of revenues and profits for the MSP. On average, our key 
informants estimate that the VAS surviving the first year have an operating 
profitability which is three times larger than those that fail in the first months after 
launch. 
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According to our key informants, it is not a viable strategy for the MSP to launch 
many new services, purposefully kill those that do not sell, and bet only on the few 
that experience an early success. This probe and learn type of strategy (Lynn et al., 
1996) is impeded by the high organizational complexity and sunk costs that launching 
a new VAS entails. Therefore, after having tested several concepts for new VAS with 
selected customers, the MSP launches only those that have the highest probability to 
stay on the market for long time. As a result, it is very unlikely that early market 
withdrawal in the mobile VAS industry is due to a purposeful decision of the MSP. 
Rather, it is typically the result of poor market acceptance of the new service. 
 
That said, we decided to operationalize our dependent variable, i.e. Early market 
survival, as a binary variable which describes whether or not the new service stays on 
the market for less than 12 months (Early market survival equals to 0 if the new 
service stays on the market for less than 12 months, 1 otherwise). This 
operationalisation leads us to consider only the mobile VAS launched in Italy between 
2003 and 2006. Table 1 shows that, in the 2003-2006 period, the number of new 
services launched through the Browsing technology was higher than those which used 
SMS. According to the experts that we interviewed, this is due to the higher flexibility 
of the Browsing platform, that allows MSPs to develop a broader range of VAS with 
heterogeneous functionalities. 
 
 
Technology – Content 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
SMS – Infotainment 106 563 383 227 1,279 
SMS – Personalization 83 212 106 142 543 
SMS – Community 66 279 312 117 774 
SMS – Gaming 41 219 224 103 587 
Browsing - Infotainment 0 1,347 873 1,870 4,090 
Browsing - Personalization 0 0 0 114 114 
Browsing - Community 0 376 275 548 1,199 
Browsing – Gaming 0 320 208 202 730 
Total 296 3,316 2,381 3,323 9,316 
Table 1: New A2P mobile VAS launched in Italy between 2003 and 2006 
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As regards the Radicalness of the new product or service, our interviews showed that 
the extent to which customers need to change their behavior and consumption pattern 
when it comes to use a new VAS depends on both the content of the service and the 
technology used to deliver it. For instance, in 2004 customers were more skeptical as 
regards the opportunity to access an infotainment service (e.g., Formula One news) 
through micro-browsing than using the SMS technology. Whereas SMS was an 
already well-known and widely-used mobile communication means in Italy, several 
factors resulted in potential users’ resistance toward purchasing browsing-based 
services. First, accessing a mobile VAS through Browsing required customers to 
completely change how they interacted with their handset. Second, customers 
preferably required handsets with large and colored screens and user-friendly 
interfaces, which were not available in Italy in 2004 yet. More importantly, most of 
the mobile phone users had pay-per-use payment schemes, which made it very costly 
to navigate the web. Of course user-friendly phones and flat tariffs gradually diffused 
after some years and customers’ resistance toward using micro-browsing to access 
VAS have decreased. As regards the content of the service, in 2004 customers’ 
insecurity regarding how enjoyable could be playing a game on the mobile phone was 
much higher than, e.g., reading daily sport updates, no matter which technological 
platform (SMS or Browsing) was used. Reading news did not require indeed a 
significant change in the way through which customers were used to interact with 
their handsets, as it happened instead when they tried to play chess for the first time 
on them. Of course, as long as games for mobile phones diffused and their user-
friendliness improved, customers learnt how to play with their handsets and became 
able to evaluate the pros and cons of purchasing and using gaming VAS. 
 
We needed therefore a method to measure the radicalness of the different categories 
of VAS (i.e., of each couple technology – content), over the years 2003-2006. We 
relied upon the assessments of a panel of experts, gathered using a two-round Delphi 
process (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963). The panel included 10 experts with different 
professional experiences: 3 are professors at Politecnico di Milano and actively 
participate in the Information and Communication Technology & Management 
Observatory, 4 are senior managers working for the major Italian MNOs, and 3 are 
managers with responsibilities for market development in different MSPs. They were 
asked to rate the radicalness, as defined in this article, of each couple technology – 
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content, for every year between 2003 and 2006. Assessments were given on a Likert 
scale ranging from 1 to 5. In the ensuing analyses, all the mobile VAS launched at 
year t and characterized by a specific combination of technology – content have been 
associated with the same mean radicalness identified through the Delphi method. For 
example, the panel of experts ranked gaming services delivered through Browsing in 
2004 as significantly radical (4.4), while infotainment services offered through SMS 
in the same year were evaluated as incremental (1.3). It should be noticed here that the 
experts took into account, when they evaluated the radicalness of each couple 
technology – content, those factors (e.g., availability of user-friendly handsets and of 
flat tariffs) that affected the extent to which customers were required to change 
behavior and consumption pattern if they wanted to use a new VAS. As an example, 
the average value of the radicalness associated to Infotainment services delivered 
through the Browsing technology decreased in 2005 (from 1.8 to 1.6), because of the 
introduction of the first user-friendly smartphones, and in 2006 (from 1.6 to 1.4), as a 
result of the appearance of the first flat tariffs in Italy. 
 
As regards investments in advertising, we operationalized this variable using two 
measures: 
 First, each mobile VAS launched at year t has been associated with the annual 
advertising expenditures (measured in €, at year t) of the MSP that launched the 
service. This variable (named Investments in corporate advertising) captures the 
impact on early survival of investments in promotional activities (conducted using 
mass-media channels such as the TV or the web) aimed at increasing the brand 
awareness and the reputation of the MSP; 
 However, our preliminary interviews suggested that a further critical tactical 
decision for the MSP is whether or not the characteristics of the specific service 
(e.g., Formula One news) should be advertised within the corporate promotional 
campaign. We captured this tactics through a binary variable called Investments in 
service advertising, which indicates whether the MSP decided to communicate the 
peculiarities of the VAS in the corporate advertising campaign (Investments in 
service advertising equals to 1) or not. 
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Finally, as regards the variable Involvement of external organizations, we decided to 
measure the extent to which the MSP involves external actors in the launch process by 
calculating the ratio between the number of different external actors that participate in 
the launch of the new VAS and the number of distinct activities required to launch itiii. 
The assumption is that the higher this ratio, the higher the presence of the external 
actors in the launch process and therefore the stronger the signaling effect toward 
potential adopters that the specific VAS will benefit from. 
 
We also introduced a set of dummy variables to control for the possible impact on 
early market survival of the type of technology used to deliver the VAS (SMS or 
Browsing) and of its content (Infotainment, Personalization, Community, Gaming). 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our variables. For each of them the original 
values are reported, instead of the standardized ones, which will be used for the 
ensuing analyses. About 66% of the mobile VAS have a life cycle shorter than 12 
months (see the row for Early market survival). The mean value of the Radicalness 
variable is equal to 1.65. On average, the MSPs invest annually 6.54 million € in 
corporate advertising activities and about 93% of all the new VAS are specifically 
advertised in corporate promotional campaigns. Finally, the Involvement of external 
organizations variable varies between 0.09 and 0.50, with the total number of distinct 
actors involved in the launch process which ranges from 1 to 4 and the total number 
of activities comprised between 8 and 12. 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Early market survival 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Radicalness of the new product or service 1.65 0.61 1.30 4.40 
Investments in corporate advertising (mln €) 6.54 3.55 0.03 33.25 
Investments in service advertising 0.93 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Involvement of external organizations 0.21 0.07 0.09 0.50 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table 3 reports both direct and interaction effects of the Logit regression that we used 
to test our hypotheses. 
 
 Direct and Interaction 
Effects 
Independent variables  
H1: Radicalness of the new product-service 
 
- 2.196** 
(0.219) 
H2: Investments in corporate advertising 
 
+ 0.259** 
(0.066) 
H2: Investments in service advertising 
 
+ 2.083 
(0.151) 
H3: Involvement of external organizations 
 
+ 2.048** 
(0.160) 
Interaction variables  
H2a: Radicalness of the new product-service X 
Investments in corporate advertising 
+ 0.137 
(0.121) 
H2a: Radicalness of the new product-service X 
Investments in service advertising 
+ 3.131** 
(0.762) 
H3a: Radicalness of the new product-service X 
Involvement of external organizations 
 
+ 3.714** 
(0.283) 
Control variables  
Technology (Browsing) + 0.786** 
(0.045) 
Content 1 (Infotainment) - 0.187 
(0.054) 
Content 2 (Personalization) + 0.063 
(0.029) 
Content  3 (Community) + 1.995 
(0.138) 
  
Pseudo R2 (Cox & Snell) 0.195 
Chi-square 2,025.94** 
Number of observations 9,316 
Standard Errors (SE) in round brackets, *p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 3: Results of the Logit regression for Early market survival 
 
Launch strategy: radicalness of the new service 
Hypothesis H1, which posits that the radicalness of the new service is negatively 
associated with early market survival, is supported by our data. Not surprisingly, the 
probability of early survival is higher for incremental than for radical innovations. 
This suggests that the smaller the change in consumption behavior required to 
prospective customers when they use the new service, the lower the uncertainty they 
perceive as regards its expected benefits and transaction costs. This is likely to lower 
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their resistance to adopt the new service soon after launch and in turn increase its 
probability of early market survival. 
 
Launch tactic: investments in advertising 
Hypothesis H2, which posits that investments in advertising are positively associated 
with early market survival, is partially supported, depending on how the independent 
variable is measured. In particular, increasing investments in corporate advertising 
improves the probability of early survival, whereas communicating the characteristics 
of the VAS within the corporate promotional campaign does not (although the 
direction of the relationship is as expected, it is not statistically significant). It seems 
therefore that disseminating information regarding the MSP is a more effective tactic 
for accelerating early diffusion in comparison with advertising the features of the 
service. One possible explanation for this finding is that improving the probability of 
early market survival is a matter of enlarging the number of customers who come to 
know about the MSP, rather than illustrating to them the characteristics of the new 
service. This is suggested by sociological theories of innovation diffusion (Van den 
Bulte and Lilien, 2001), which show that those who purchase an innovation earlier 
than the average customer are more exposed to mass communication channels, but are 
more risk tolerant and have the lucidity and skills that enable them to value the 
characteristics of the innovation and estimate its expected benefits and costs (Rogers, 
2003). As a result, it might be not that critical to give these early buyers information 
regarding the peculiarities of the new service, but rather to increase the number of 
individuals who, coming to know about the existence of the MSP, may purchase it 
soon after launch. 
 
Now we deepen the analysis considering the interaction effects with the radicalness of 
the innovation. Also Hypothesis H2a, which proposes that investments in advertising 
have a stronger association with early market survival for more radical new services, 
is partially supported. Investments in service advertising have indeed a stronger 
positive impact on the probability of early survival for radical than incremental 
innovations. Considering only the radically-new VAS in our dataset (i.e. the new 
services with an associated radicalness higher than the average value of 1.65), we find 
that those able to survive the first year after launch are more likely to have been 
advertised in the corporate communication campaign that those that are not (see the t 
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test reported in Table 4). This does not happen however with incrementally-new VAS, 
as shown by the t test reported in Table 5: incrementally-new services which do not 
survive the first year after launch and those that remain on the market for a longer 
time don't show significant differences as regards investments in service advertising. 
These findings are in line with the direct and interaction effects regarding the 
Investments in Service Advertising variable reported in Table 3. 
 
 Radically-new services 
which do not survive the 
first year after launch 
Radically-new services 
which survive the first year 
after launch 
Investments in service advertising 71.2% 98.4% 
N 2,233 378 
T -23.597** 
Df 2,132.734 
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 4: Impact of Investments in service advertising on the Early market survival 
of radically-new VAS 
 
 Incrementally-new services 
which do not survive the 
first year after launch 
Incrementally-new services 
which survive the first year 
after launch 
Investments in service advertising 100.0% 98.6% 
N 3,884 2,821 
T 1.288 
Df 2,820.000 
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 5: Impact of Investments in service advertising on the Early market survival 
of incrementally-new VAS 
 
One possible explanation for this finding is that the more radical the innovation, the 
more important conveying the characteristics, the advantages and the peculiarities of 
the new service to potential customers becomes. This can be explained considering 
that, due to the high radicalness of the new service, even those adopters who are used 
to purchase early, who are on average more risk tolerant and able to value the benefits 
and costs of the innovation, perceive a soaring uncertainty and need information 
regarding how sophisticated the new service is and what additional functionalities it 
enables, to overcome their resistance to buy (Moore, 1991). 
 
However, the positive impact on the probability of early survival of increasing 
investments in corporate advertising appears to be relevant for both radically- and 
incrementally-new services. Both radically-new and incrementally-new services able 
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to survive the first year after launch are associated indeed with investments in 
corporate advertising significantly higher than those not able to survive (see the t test 
reported in Table 6 and Table 7). This is in line with the results of the Logit regression 
for the Investments in Corporate Advertising variable shown in Table 3. 
 
 Radically-new services 
which do not survive the 
first year after launch 
(mln €) 
Radically-new services 
which survive the first year 
after launch 
(mln €) 
Investments in corporate advertising 5.380 5.802 
N 2,233 378 
T -6.337** 
Df 1,055.890 
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 6: Impact of Investments in Corporate Advertising on the Early Market Survival 
of radically-new VAS 
 
 Incrementally-new services 
which do not survive the 
first year after launch 
(mln €) 
Incrementally-new services 
which survive the first year 
after launch 
(mln €) 
Investments in corporate advertising 6.274 7.909 
N 3,884 2,821 
T -17.213** 
Df 6,703.000 
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 7: Impact of Investments in corporate advertising on the Early market survival 
of incrementally-new VAS 
 
One possible explanation for this finding is that increasing investments in corporate 
advertising enhances the number of potential adopters who come to know about the 
existence of the MSP and its services soon after launch, but does not reduce their pre-
purchase uncertainty. Whereas reducing uncertainty surrounding early customers’ 
adoption decisions is more critical for the early market survival of radical innovations, 
in comparison with incremental ones, increasing the number of potential early 
adopters is likely to be an equally important determinant of early market survival for 
both radically- and incrementally-new products. 
 
Launch tactic: involvement of external organizations 
The data in Table 3 provide also support for Hypothesis H3, which proposes that 
involvement of external organizations in the launch process is positively associated 
with early market survival. This suggests that having several external actors taking 
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part in launch activities increases the visibility of the new VAS in the eyes of potential 
customers and signals extensive commitment and endorsement for it, which helps 
reduce their uncertainty and resistance to change and ultimately encourages diffusion, 
therefore improving the probability of early survival. 
 
Interestingly, also Hypothesis H3a, which posits that involvement of external 
organizations in the launch of the innovation has a stronger association with early 
market survival for more radical new services, is supported. Consistently with the 
results of the Logit regression for the Involvement of External Organizations variable 
(see the direct and interaction effects in Table 3), both radically-new and 
incrementally-new services able to survive the first year after launch are characterized 
by a higher value of Involvement of External Organizations than those that are not 
(see the t test reported in Table 8 and Table 9). That said, the differences between the 
mean values of Involvement of External Organizations for those services which do not 
survive the first year after launch and those that survive (0.047 in the case of 
radically-new services and 0.013 in the case of incrementally-new services) point to 
the stronger impact that this launch tactic has on the early market survival of more 
radical new services. 
 
 Radically-new services 
which do not survive the 
first year after launch 
Radically-new services 
which survive the first year 
after launch 
Involvement of external organizations 0.187 0.234 
N 2,233 378 
T -16.221** 
Df 1,268.094 
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 8: Impact of Involvement of external organizations on the Early market survival 
of radically-new VAS 
 
 Incrementally-new services 
which do not survive the 
first year after launch 
Incrementally-new services 
which survive the first year 
after launch 
Involvement of external organizations 0.207 0.220 
N 3,884 2,821 
T -9.773** 
Df 6,452.064 
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 9: Impact of Involvement of external organizations on the Early market survival 
of incrementally-new VAS 
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One possible explanation for these findings is that this launch tactic is particularly 
appropriate for reducing uncertainty perceived by those early customers who are 
taking into serious consideration the opportunity to purchase a new service soon after 
launch, mostly if it requires considerable changes to their behavior and consumption 
patterns, but also in case the new service is incremental in nature. 
 
As regards our control variables, Table 3 indicates that the new services delivered 
through the Browsing technology have a higher probability of early survival than 
those based on SMS, independently from their radicalness. This possibly suggests that 
potential customers had a preference for VAS offered through Browsing because this 
technology enabled more interactive functionalities and thus allowed the MSP to 
develop and propose more appealing services. No statistically significant effects on 
the probability of early survival can be attributed instead to the content (Infotainment, 
Personalization, Communication, Gaming) of the new mobile VAS. 
 
Finally, the same models reported in Table 3 have been tested separately for each year 
of our dataset (2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006) and we always had comparable results. 
Additional analyses were undertaken to see if our results are robust despite the fact 
that: (i) not all the technologies (i.e. SMS and Browsing) and types of content (i.e. 
Infotainment, Personalization, Communication and Gaming) were available in each 
year of our dataset; (ii) the dataset includes categories of VAS at different stages (i.e. 
growth and decline) of their life-cycle; (iii) user-friendly smartphones and flat tariffs, 
i.e. complementary products and services which might affect the diffusion of mobile 
VAS, were not available in Italy in each year of the dataset. These analyses, which 
confirmed the robustness of our findings, are available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Considering the surprisingly high number of new products and services that are 
withdrawn from the market soon after launch, this article investigates how early 
market survival is affected by the degree of radicalness of the innovation and by the 
adoption of two launch tactics, namely investments in advertising and involvement of 
external organizations during the launch process. Furthermore, it studies how the 
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impact on early market survival of these two launch tactics depends on the radicalness 
of the new product or service being launched. 
 
Using a dataset comprising more than 9,300 new mobile Value Added Services 
(VAS) launched in Italy between 2003 and 2006, the article indicates that the more 
radical the innovation, the higher the likelihood of incurring an early failure. 
Therefore, product and marketing managers who are seeking to reap the potential 
advantages from launching a radically-new product or service (i.e., higher margins, 
expanded market, improved reputation) should be aware of the challenges that this 
strategic launch decision implies in terms of early customer acceptance. Moreover, 
they should take into account that, in order to improve the likelihood of early market 
survival of a radical innovation, some launch tactics can be more effective than others. 
In this regard, our analysis indicates that communicating the distinctive characteristics 
of the new product or service to the prospective customers and partnering with 
external organizations during the launch process are tactics which work particularly 
well with radical innovations. This is probably due to the fact that they help reduce 
customers’ uncertainty regarding expected benefits and transaction costs and hence 
contribute to win their resistance to adopt the innovation soon after launch. On the 
other hand, investments in corporate advertising lead instead to a tangible 
improvement of the probability of early market survival for both radical and 
incremental innovations. In other words, the positive impact on the probability of 
early survival of increasing investments in corporate advertising appears to be 
relevant for both radically- and incrementally-new services. One possible explanation 
is that this tactic serves the purpose to increase the number of potential customers who 
come to know about the existence of the innovating firm and its offering soon after 
launch, which is equally important to stimulate early diffusion for both incremental 
and radical innovations. It does not reduce instead their pre-purchase uncertainty and 
resistance to change, which would be instead a much more critical determinant of 
early survival for radically-new products and services. 
 
As regards research implications, the article encourages new product launch scholars 
to develop a more fine-grained understanding of the interaction effects between other 
tactical and strategic launch decisions. This would be useful to give product and 
marketing managers a comprehensive framework that helps them evaluate how 
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changes in marketing mix variables will affect product performance depending on the 
strategic context in which launch occurs. Moreover, it points to the importance of 
focusing on a further critical dimension when studying new product or service 
success, i.e. early market survival. Product management and launch strategy research 
could investigate in the future what further endogenous (i.e. managerial levers) and 
exogenous (i.e. environmental conditions) variables affect this particular aspect of 
innovation performance. The article also contributes to diffusion of innovation 
research by studying how some critical supply-side factors (i.e. decisions taken during 
the market launch of the innovation) affect a very important dimension of diffusion 
processes, i.e. early market survival. Future research is needed to understand how 
these decisions affect other characteristics of the adoption process, e.g., the speed at 
which new products and services are adopted. 
 
The investigation obviously leaves several gaps that will require further research to be 
filled. First, it focuses on new product and service diffusion in consumer markets, 
especially those where it is of strategic importance for the innovating firm to 
maximize the probability of success of each new product or service that it launches. 
Although it could be possible to analytically generalize the findings of the article to 
industries with similar characteristics, e.g., the broadcasting, movie, or publishing 
industries, further research is needed to investigate whether, and to what extent, the 
impact of launch decisions on early market survival holds true also in other markets. 
Moreover, we deliberately focused on high-technology innovations in this article. It 
would be fascinating to understand what type of launch decisions affect the odds of 
after launch survival for different types of new products or services, e.g., design-
driven innovations. Finally, work is needed to improve the operationalisation of the 
early market survival variable. In particular, depending on the average life cycle of 
new products, early survival should be measured on a few-week or many-month 
period after launch. In this article, the 12-month threshold has been chosen based on 
interviews with industry experts. There is however the need to identify more objective 
criteria to establish the length of this period in different industries. 
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i These definitions can be found in the PDMA glossary (http://www.pdma.org/library/glossary.html). 
 
ii One of the authors is the Scientific Director of the Information and Communication Technology & 
Management Observatory research group. This made it easier for us to plan and carry out a set of 
interviews with experts in the Italian mobile VAS industry and take part to several conferences and 
workgroups organized by the Information and Communication Technology & Management 
Observatory prior to starting our analyses. In particular, we personally interviewed 12 key informants 
(4 top managers from the largest Italian MSPs, 5 marketing managers working for the major Italian 
MNOs and 3 top managers from Italian WEs), for a total of more than 10 hours of tape-recorded 
interviews. This preliminary analysis was aimed at understanding how the MSP organizes the launch of 
a new VAS, which are its strategic priorities and objectives, what tactics it uses to increase the chances 
of achieving substantial diffusion, how the key variables in our analysis could be operationalized.  
 
iii There is a maximum of 5 distinct actors that can be involved in the launch by the MSP: Mobile 
Network Operator, Mobile Content Provider, Mobile Technology Provider, Record & Movie 
Production Company and Web Editor. There is a maximum of 12 activities that have to be carried out 
to launch a new VAS: platform development, content creation, content packaging, content publishing, 
content management, portal provisioning, advertising content creation, advertising bundling, content 
delivery, content charging, accounting and customer relationship management. It should be noticed that 
some new VAS do not require that all these activities are undertaken to be launched on the market. 
 
